

25X6
General Comments on Enclosed [REDACTED] Material

It is suggested that the enclosed Military Section on a country which is in some ways comparable to [REDACTED] as a minor military power might be helpful as a model of organization to follow in the revision of the [REDACTED] military section.

The reader would still not be entirely satisfied on certain main points, as for example, what, really, is the military potential, and ^{what} would the [REDACTED] do with it in any likely event. Pp. 14-15 should answer this, but there is some question left. Alternative #1 says they might fight if there were a prospect of help, but that pretty soon they would just lie down and give up. Alternative #2 says that on the other hand, [REDACTED] approves of freedom and self-reliance. But if the Soviets should start walking in, how long could and how long would the [REDACTED] with a navy superior to that of the USSR in the Baltic, hold them off. In other words, would it be worth the while of the US to think in terms of rushing to the aid of [REDACTED] rather than somebody else, in event of war? Are the geographical approaches to [REDACTED] such that aid could get there?

The statement that the [REDACTED] are third strongest in Europe seems not to take into account the reason--not that they are absolutely, but that their neighbors are temporarily weak. Assuming, however, that they currently occupy third place, their military establishment would seem to need more thorough treatment than it receives here.

Though something has been said about conscription and some sort of reserve, it is not at all clear just what the reserve potentialities are, what the organization is, or how much reserve training the [REDACTED] military can count on.

There is nothing whatever on natural resources--what part [REDACTED] might play in the [REDACTED] or anybody else's calculations, for instance, or the lack

of coal ditto. Though ^{25X6} [REDACTED] is believed to be a munitions outfit of some importance, there is hardly a word about it. The question is still left as to why the ^{25X6} [REDACTED] could not build and store a national armament which would make them more or less impervious to the imports that would be cut off by a war. Only by inference can one discover whether or not the ^{25X6} [REDACTED] are capable of producing aircraft or whether they might not begin to do so if they wanted to. There is nothing about air bases as facilities for handling heavy bombers.

Extraneous Comments

- P. 1 -- Present policies call for "active defense" but strong factors are against defense. Why, then, adopt a defensive policy? Next, the opinions of ^{25X6} [REDACTED] Then the budget. Why? No change in the OB is expected, which is interesting except that we don't know what it is now.
- P. 2 -- Organisation and conscription policies all in 100 words. "Equipment is good but light" but on page 7 it says that equipment is bad. ^{25X6} [REDACTED] -- see no reason bringing them in unless there's something more to say about them -- e.g., why the ^{25X6} [REDACTED] should be so hipped on having a lot of women in the army.
- P. 3 -- Don't doubt that ^{25X6} [REDACTED] navy is stronger than Russian ^{25X6} [REDACTED] but if so, think it would call for a word of explanation -- e.g. comparison of forces there and perhaps reason why USSR is willing to be the weaker party in this area. Personnel are "natural seamen" (if so, why train them?) with good discipline but bad morale (odd) who have become specialists because of increased mechanisation in a navy woefully lacking in modern armament but willing to modernise.

- P. 4 -- "The general state of readiness of the navy is about equal to that of the US fleet in 1934-35." If this means anything, it would be hard to detect what. A great shortcoming of the fleet is "too little experience in rough water" which seems peculiar for a fleet whose whole policy is based on sherry-hopping along the coast ^{25X6} [REDACTED] "The general tactical concept" etc. would not tell the reader much.
- P. 5 -- 200 words would seem a rather brief treatment for the third best airforce in Europe.
- P. 6 -- Are these organizations considered to have any military significance from the point of view of this SR or are they merely in the church-social class?
- P. 7 -- "There are no organized reserve units; "yet there is a considerable backlog of reserve officers."
- P. 8 -- Hardly think these 25 words describe the war potential of the navy. If they are immobilised ^{25X6} [REDACTED] all winter, anybody else would be too. The way I read paragraph 3, it says that if the ^{25X6} [REDACTED] could get certain things that they can't get, they would have a first-class fighting machine if they had the manpower which they haven't.
- P. 9 -- Despite references to Section II, it would be hard to conceive how this whole question of natural resources and industrial potential (which would seem exceptional important here) could be covered in 75 words.
- Pp. 10-13 -- Could be revised to harmonize with rest of chapter: as it stands, it seems like something thrown in -- which it is.

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P. 14 -- Army is better equipped than most European armies (though very badly equipped indeed (p. 7) and is carefully though insufficiently trained which raises the question of how one could be so careful as to train somebody insufficiently.

Summary. Would seem inadequate as a summary, especially in view of the fact that many readers will never get beyond this section, thus making it to that extent more important than any of the others. Suggest that one of the published summaries (e.g. Albania) be used as a model.

Sections V and VI. Suggest it would be best to leave these until the rest of the paper is well along and then expand them in light of most recent events.

(Enclosed are comments of GRE Military Group.)